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When I agreed to contribute an essay reflecting on the work 
of Deborah Rhode, I expected it to be in her honor rather than in 
her memory. She passed away unexpectedly at the age of sixty-
eight on January 8, 2021.1 The opportunity to reflect on her legacy 
thus takes on a new urgency—and even greater significance. The 
legal profession is better for the time she spent in it.2 
I was fortunate enough to know Deborah first as a professor 
and later as a coauthor and a friend. She was only the second 
woman to join the faculty at Stanford Law School—following in 
the giant footsteps of Barbara Babcock.3 Deborah served on the 
faculty for over forty years, as well as in significant board and 
leadership positions throughout the academy and the broader 
profession, including an important stint as president of the 
Association of American Law Schools from 1998 to 1999. In every 
position she held, Deborah advocated for equity and inclusion, as 
well as for fundamental changes to the legal profession that 
would make it more ethical, fair, and humane.4 
Deborah wore twin hats as a scholar, devoting equal time to 
legal ethics and gender law. The most-cited legal ethics scholar 
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 2 For a deep dive into Deborah’s interest in ethics and leadership, see John Roemer, 
The Moral Force of Deborah Rhode, STAN. MAG. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/ 
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for many years running and the author of thirteen books on pro-
fessional responsibility, her imprint on that field is undeniable.5 
Among other contributions, Deborah was a powerful voice for the 
argument that the legal profession’s tight controls on who can 
perform legal services is a key reason why many people in our 
society are denied access to justice. 
Her contributions to gender law were just as deep and signif-
icant. Like many in the field of gender law, Deborah longed for a 
world in which women were full, equal members of society. She 
became passionate about women’s issues after watching her own 
mother struggle to obtain an education and a career after time at 
home raising Deborah and her sister.6 She was an eyewitness to 
the harm caused by stereotypical attitudes that first pressured 
women to find husbands rather than careers and then sidelined 
them for their “choices.” She vowed never to be a woman who 
needed an allowance from her husband—and, though married for 
more than four decades, she certainly never was. Deborah’s 
earliest passions revolved around the need to address poverty 
and racial justice; her lifelong focus on access to justice was 
deeply informed by those early commitments.7 But while a stu-
dent at Yale—she was among the first women to attend after the 
school became coeducational—she was also turned onto women’s 
rights after a professor recommended that she read Simone de 
Beauvoir’s The Second Sex in 1970.8 The spark lit by that book 
remained bright for Deborah throughout her life and career. 
Deborah is widely recognized as one of the most significant 
contributors to the field of gender law. The field did not begin in 
earnest until the 1970s, when women’s rights advocates first suc-
ceeded in getting courts and legislatures to recognize rights of sex 
equality. Beginning in 1971, the Supreme Court recognized that 
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sex-based classifications were very likely to reflect stereotypes 
and assumptions about women that had led to their inferior treat-
ment by the government throughout history—recognition that led 
to the adoption of heightened scrutiny and the invalidation of 
most of the sex-based classifications that filled up state and fed-
eral code books.9 Around the same time, advocates won key legis-
lative victories—such as the Equal Pay Act of 1963,10 Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 197212—and key court rulings to establish a 
broad scope for these new antidiscrimination laws.13 The result of 
these judicial and legislative developments was a rapid transition 
from a country with no positive law of sex equality to one with 
significant equality guarantees over the course of less than a dec-
ade. The field of gender law was born of these developments—and 
of the work of people like Deborah Rhode. 
The constitutional and statutory guarantees of sex equality 
were the scaffolding, but the substance of gender law would be 
built out over time by advocates, lawyers, and scholars. The field 
was built by those who identified areas of inquiry, developed the 
theoretical approaches necessary to understand the nature of 
gender discrimination, and drew theoretical and doctrinal connec-
tions across a variety of contexts. Deborah was expertly engaged 
in all of these tasks. She had an incredible eye for interesting sto-
ries and controversies and the rhetorical skill to capture the at-
 
 9 The Supreme Court began the movement toward heightened scrutiny in Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688–91 (1973), 
before settling on intermediate scrutiny for sex-based classifications in Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 197–99 (1976). 
 10 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 7752 Stat. 106256 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206(d)). 
 11 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17). 
 12 Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, 373–
75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88). 
 13 See, e.g., International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) 
(invalidating as sex discrimination an employer’s fetal-protection policy, which prohibited 
nonsterile women from holding jobs involving lead exposure in a battery manufacturing 
plant); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–42 (1989) (interpreting Title VII 
to prohibit employment decisions motivated by sex-role stereotyping), superseded on other 
grounds by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–
67 (1986) (establishing that sexual harassment is an actionable form of intentional sex 
discrimination); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (establishing 
the sex-plus theory of discrimination that can be used to challenge employment policies or 
decisions based on sex plus a neutral characteristic). 
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tention of others. She was fascinated by culture and relied on re-
flections of it to understand and teach the field. As her students 
and colleagues can attest, she had a carefully curated collection 
of cartoons and other images to accompany every lecture and 
presentation—a sometimes-lighthearted reminder of the very 
substantive point that gender law is neither developed nor ap-
plied in a vacuum. In her scholarly writing, she tackled nearly 
everything: bias in the legal profession, the history of the legal 
profession, glass ceiling issues, structural and unconscious bias, 
sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination, women in leader-
ship, bias in courtrooms, gender discrimination in education, and 
appearance discrimination.14 And she was one of the first people 
to tie these issues together as a field of study. An early mono-
graph, Justice and Gender, became an important sourcebook for 
those researching or teaching gender law. In that book, Deborah 
comprehensively explored “the law’s responses to [gender] dis-
crimination within their broader cultural context” and sought to 
“reorient legal doctrine from its traditional focus on sex-based dif-
ference toward a concern with sex-based disadvantage.”15 Those 
twin aims are seen throughout Deborah’s larger body of work. The 
persistence of gender inequity was undeniable—and 
unacceptable. 
Deborah deployed this strategy in a wide variety of contexts, 
making the case that gender affects every single aspect of 
women’s lives—and every public, private, and social institution. 
She explored the complicated interplay between law and cultural 
perceptions of gender as well as the challenges of using law as a 
tool for radical social change. In a fitting retort to her first dean 
 
 14 Her signature contributions to the study of gender law include DEBORAH L. 
RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN EVERYDAY LIFE (2010) [here-
inafter THE BEAUTY BIAS]; DEBORAH L. RHODE, WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP (2016); 
DEBORAH L. RHODE, WHAT WOMEN WANT: AN AGENDA FOR THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
(2014); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 
(1989) [hereinafter JUSTICE AND GENDER]; DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE 
DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY (1997); Deborah L. Rhode, The Subtle Side of Sexism, 16 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 613 (2007); Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 1207; Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 
(1990); Deborah L. Rhode, The “No-Problem” Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural 
Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731 (1991) [hereinafter The “No-Problem” Problem]; Deborah L. 
Rhode, Women’s Rights and Social Wrongs, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13 (1991); Deborah 
L. Rhode, Media Images, Feminist Issues, 20 SIGNS 685 (1995); Deborah L. Rhode, Associ-
ation and Assimilation, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 106 (1986); and Deborah L. Rhode, Missing 
Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1993). 
 15 JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 14, at 1. 
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at Stanford, who suggested she teach a “real” subject like nego-
tiable instruments rather than the course in sex discrimination 
she had proposed, Deborah helped build the field and cement its 
place in law school scholarship and teaching. Today, it is unques-
tionably a “real” subject worthy of study. 
In a short essay, it is impossible to do justice to Deborah’s 
contributions, which were so broad and varied. Indeed, her signa-
ture talent was the ability to explore varied individual topics con-
cretely and yet tie them together coherently. Her synthetic 
strengths were on full display in two early books—Justice and 
Gender and Speaking of Sex—that became foundational texts in 
the field of gender law. Like her other writings, these books were 
written in a manner that was accessible and inviting, a quality 
that helped propel her to the top of citation-count lists. She made 
the problems of gender inequity real for her readers rather than 
miring them in high theory. 
Her efforts to document and explain problems of inequity 
were not accidental. One early insight of hers captures so much 
of what she thought, what she did, and why. In a 1991 article in 
the Yale Law Journal, Deborah wrote of the “‘no-problem’ prob-
lem”—a term she used to convey a disturbing level of societal com-
fort with sex-based disparities, which appeared to many to be 
“natural, functional, and, in large measure, unalterable.”16 Too 
few, she suggested, saw the disparities as a problem that merited 
a legal or social response; those that did see a problem “con-
ceive[d] it too narrowly” by ignoring either the many forms of dis-
advantage that existed despite neutral rules and practices or “the 
intersection of gender with other patterns of subordination such 
as class, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.”17 The narrowing 
matters, she wrote, because it “reinforces attitudes that deny its 
existence”; the establishment of individual equality rights “forti-
fies the illusion that collective problems have been resolved.”18 
The failure to perceive a problem is itself, she argued, a problem. 
Rather than join the hordes who accepted the progress narrative 
around women’s rights, Deborah began the important work of ex-
ploring “legal norms that reflect and reinforce these ideologies of 
denial as well as the feminist challenge that they present.”19 
 
 16 The “No-Problem” Problem, supra note 14, at 1734. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 1735. 
 19 Id. 
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In later work, Deborah took seriously the obligation to first 
convince her audience that there was a gender problem. Her pop-
ular book The Beauty Bias is illustrative of her approach to the 
study of gender law. She begins with a stunningly exhaustive re-
view of the empirical evidence related to appearance discrimina-
tion. She begins with evidence of “nearly universal preferences 
such as clear skin, facial symmetry, and hour-glass figures.”20 She 
continues with a detailed and nuanced exploration of the biases 
based on body weight, attractiveness, and sex—and the very real 
harms from higher costs (e.g., extra airline seats) to lost job op-
portunities due to false assessments of competence and intelli-
gence.21 She also explores the intersection of appearance discrim-
ination with gender, a study that reveals evidence of standards 
that are nearly impossible for women to meet. They must conform 
to sex-specific dress and grooming standards, which are often ex-
pensive and time-consuming to satisfy. They must be feminine 
and attractive—but not enough to tempt men or make their wives 
jealous. They must conform to beauty standards of youth, regard-
less of the effects of aging. Their appearance is scrutinized in a 
way that men’s appearance is not—and if they do not make it ap-
pear effortless, they will be “ridiculed as vain for their efforts to 
measure up.”22 But the existence of gender-based appearance dis-
crimination is only part of the problem. It encourages women to 
undertake expensive and sometimes dangerous body alterations. 
It forces women into a feminine persona that may deny them 
rights of individual expression. It can even be dangerous—a point 
Deborah drives home with compelling facts about toxic cosmetics, 
foot-damaging shoes, risky plastic surgery (including one to in-
crease “toe cleavage”), eating disorders, steroid abuse, and even a 
single year in the nineteenth century when three thousand 
women were burned alive because of flammable petticoats.23 And 
women who resist these pressures suffer a variety of penalties, 
including lost job opportunities. 
Deborah’s gift for seizing on a simple, culturally resonant ex-
ample to make a sophisticated point is on full display in this book. 
High heels, she explains, reflect the high degree of sex differenti-
ation embodied in dress codes and norms, the unstated require-
 
 20 THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 14, at 7. 
 21 See id. at 27–28. 
 22 Id. at 11. 
 23 Id. at 4, 36, 39. 
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ment that even professional women live up to the ideals of femi-
ninity, and the harm inflicted on women by society’s unforgiving 
standards.24 In marshaling examples (often with clever or shock-
ing images to accompany them) that resonated with her audience, 
Deborah understood that half the battle in gender law is shak-
ing people of the comfort that they have developed with a sex-
stratified society and their unwillingness to question the norms 
and practices that operate to the systematic disadvantage of 
women. No doubt her history as a champion debater prepped her 
for this task. 
Unlike many legal scholars, Deborah applied her theories 
and ideas outside traditional academic work, where they could be 
used to effect real change. Perhaps most notable is the central 
role she played in three different reports of the American Bar 
Association—The Unfinished Agenda, Balanced Lives, and Sex-
Based Harassment.25 Each was a significant project designed to 
uncover and then eliminate the remaining barriers to gender in-
equity in the legal profession. As in her academic work, Deborah 
gathered and presented empirical data to document the existence 
of bias and disparities along every available axis. And, like in 
most of her work, she communicated her findings and recommen-
dations in language that could be easily understood and that 
would resonate with her audience. 
As ready as Deborah was to expose the inherent disad-
vantage for women in many societal norms—and solve the “‘no 
problem’ problem”—she was nuanced in her theories about the 
demands of equality and proposals for reform. As a general mat-
ter, she focused on practices and rules that impaired equal oppor-
tunity, judged people based on irrelevant characteristics rather 
than their ability and effort, or exacerbated disadvantages based 
on immutable characteristics. In this she was not so different 
from many other feminist legal theorists, who drew on notions of 
both formal and substantive equality to argue for social and legal 
reform. But Deborah was not an absolutist and often worried that 
overregulation could chill individuality and free expression. In 
the context of appearance discrimination, for example, she tried 
to draw the line that would best allow women to express their 
authentic selves, whether that involved stilettoes and makeup or 
not. She struggled with the tension between individual autonomy 
 
 24 Id. at 154–55. 
 25 See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, SEX-BASED HARASSMENT: WORKPLACE 
POLICIES FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2002). 
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and the subordination of women as a group. When Deborah 
asked, “Can’t we criticize appearance-related practices without 
criticizing the women who find them necessary?” she suggested 
that the tension could be resolved, in line with her rejection of 
absolutism.26 
Throughout her four-decade career as a legal scholar, 
Deborah never wavered in her commitment to women’s autonomy 
and equality. She agreed with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg that 
“[w]omen belong in all places where decisions are being made.”27 
Toward the end of her career, she began to focus on broad themes, 
such as leadership, adultery, character, and ambition. These pro-
jects allowed her to combine her interest in cultural norms and 
legal theory and to write, as she enjoyed, for a broad audience. 
Deborah Rhode died too young, a loss that will reverberate in 
the legal academy for a long time. But we are all the better for the 
contributions she made to gender law. The task remains for the 
rest of us to carry forward with her insights and her desire for 
change. 
 
 26 THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 14, at 84, 88–89. 
 27 Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY (May 5, 2009), 
https://perma.cc/T6TB-2VQE. 
